We argue that a higher degree of de facto independence of the legal system from the other government branches as well as public trust in the legal system may reduce the average inflation record of countries through a direct and an indirect channel. The direct channel works by affecting potential output, while the indirect channel helps to increase the de facto independence of the central bank. In the empirical section of the paper, we present evidence in favor of both channels in a sample containing both industrial and Third World countries. A model that contains legal trust in addition to de jure central bank independence, checks and balances within government, and openness can explain 60% of the variation in the logarithm of the inflation rate.
Independence of both judiciary and central bank means that its representatives can expect their decisions to be implemented even if they are not in line with the (short-term) interests of government members. Independence also means that judges or board members of central banks do not have to anticipate other negative consequences as a result of their decisions such as (i) being expelled, (ii) being paid less, or (iii) being made less influential. We further propose to distinguish between de jure and de facto independence with regard to both CBI and judicial independence (JI). De jure CBI would be equivalent to CBI as measured on the basis of legal documents whereas de facto CBI would be equivalent to CBI as factually implemented. Early on, Cukierman (1992, 370) clarified that CBI does not mean that the board members can do anything but rather the ability to stick to the objective of price stability. Tighter constraints on the central bankers (e.g. on borrowing to the government) can thus translate into higher degrees of independence.
The second order commitment problem shortly described in the introduction implies that simply delegating competence to some formally independent agency such as a central bank might not be sufficient to turn promises into credible commitments. The capacity to credibly commit might depend on other institutional features such as a factually independent judiciary. If the judiciary is factually independent, the government is able to make credible commitments. The promise -made in t 0 -to pay bondholders x% interest on their bonds in t 1 is credible if a third party, i.e. neither the government nor the bondholders, has the power to ascertain who has breached the contract and if its decisions are binding even if they are not in the interest of one of the parties, e.g. the government. This is exactly the definition of judicial independence chosen above. If the judiciary is factually independent in this sense, the government is restricted in its actions. But the flipside is that this enables the government to make credible commitments. In the example, interest rates can be expected to be lower.
Due to the second order commitment problem, the delegation of competence to a formally independent central bank or judiciary is not sufficient to allow the government to make credible commitments. It is not de jure independence that counts but rather de facto independence. This theoretical point has recently been confirmed by empirical evidence. On the basis of 73 countries, Voigt (2003, 2004) show that de jure JI is largely irrelevant for economic growth, whereas de facto JI does seem to be conducive to economic growth in a significant and robust manner. With regard to CBI, we expect similar results. In fact, the observation that de jure CBI is a good predictor for inflation rates only in OECD countries, whereas the turnover rate fares better in LDCs can be interpreted as corroboration of this insight. It would imply that in OECD countries, de jure CBI is approximately equivalent to de facto CBI, whereas the two systematically deviate in LDCs. The main focus of our analysis will therefore be on de facto indicators. We distinguish between two transmission mechanisms through which a factually independent judiciary could be conducive to low inflation: a direct one and an indirect one. The indirect one is based on the assumption that a high degree of de facto JI leads to a high degree of de facto CBI (assuming a high level of de jure CBI), which, in turn, leads to low levels of inflation. The direct one is based on the insight that high levels of de facto JI lead to more output. The indirect transmission channel is presented first.
The likelihood that factual CBI will remain low although CBI is formally high is (an inverse) function of the government's capacity to credibly commit to its promises. The relevant promise refers to a monetary policy which is carried out independently from the (short-term) interests of the government by a central bank. The government's capacity to credibly commit to its promises crucially depends on the factual independence that the judiciary enjoys. Ex post, the judiciary can be interpreted as an attempt of coming to terms with the commitment problem of the state.
The laws passed by the legislature will be more credible if it is another branch that decides on their interpretation and enforcement. The hypothesis that a high degree of de facto JI is conducive to a high degree of de facto CBI is based on the assumption that a high degree of de facto JI can also be interpreted as a proxy for a high probability that government will remain within the constraints spelled out in legal documents, the constitution included. Only if the judiciary is factually independent from government interference can economic agents trust that formally passed laws will factually be implemented. A general expectation that formally passed laws will factually be implemented includes, of course, the expectation that a formally independent CBI will also turn out to be factually independent. The argument does not necessarily imply that the governing board of a central bank has the competence to take a government to court if it believes the government to renege on the rules concerning the bank's independence.
The courts should not be interpreted as a veto player who could detain the central bank from implementing its policies. But the courts might be able to act as a veto player against government in case it tries to detain the board members of the central bank from implementing a particular monetary policy. Thus they would not veto the central bank but rather the other branches of government that try to renege on the independence of the central bank. Keefer and Stasavage (2003) put forward an alternative institutional channel that leads to higher de facto CBI. They argue that the introduction of a formally independent central bank will be more credible if it takes place in a system with a high number of veto players. The presence of multiple veto players with different preferences makes government policies more difficult to change and thus more credible. Hence, a high number of veto players would make the degree of de jure CBI a reliable proxy for de facto CBI.
Let us now turn to the non-CBI related transmission mechanism, i.e. to the hypothesis that a high degree of de facto JI does not work via a high degree of de facto CBI, but rather influences the inflation rate directly. This argument can be demonstrated within the framework of two simple but widely-used models. Our first direct argument linking inflation and de facto JI starts from the assumption that an independent and trustworthy legal system reduces transaction costs in the economy, as contracts can be more easily enforced and risk premia will be lower. Trust can be interpreted as another way to solve the time-consistency problem mentioned above. If general legal trust is high, private agents will not expect a government to renege on its promises by, for example, initiating a burst of unanticipated inflation for achieving short-term economic objectives. If the probability of surprise inflation is low, wage contracts need not contain a premium, leading to higher degrees of price stability. In addition, the danger that supply shocks cause sustained second-round effects through a wage-price spiral can be avoided. Again, private agents do not expect the government to additionally boost prices through lose monetary policy.
This line of reasoning can be illustrated using the seminal model by Barro and Gordon (1983) , which has been primarily used to illustrate the consequences of time-inconsistency within the framework of monetary policy setting, the indirect channel from the legal system via CBI to inflation sketched above. In its simplest form the model consists of the following two equations:
where: π = inflation rate, The conventional argument related to CBI focuses upon the size of the expected inflation rate in conjunction with γ. It is argued that a higher degree of credible inflation aversion reduces the time-inconsistency problem induced by the incentive of the central bank to surprise the private agents. This can be achieved by placing a high and credible weight upon the inflation objective,
i.e. γ should be high. It is here where, for instance, Keefer and Stasavage (2003) bring in their hypothesis of a high number of veto players. Here we would like to stress a different relationship. First, we assume that a more independent judiciary or trusted legal system reduces transaction costs. Second, lower transaction costs cause overall economic efficiency to improve, which again will cause a fall in the natural unemployment rate. This direct effect of the legal system on the inflation rate is due to the specification of the Phillips-curve, which implies that following a reduction in the natural rate of unemployment inflation will also be lower in the rational expectations long-run equilibrium.
A second framework that helps to illustrate the direct channel from the legal system to inflation is the Svensson model (1997), which describes an economy using three equations.
Aggregate supply curve:
Aggregate demand curve:
Central bank loss function:
where: π t = inflation in period t, y t = output gap (y t -y*) in period t, y* = potential output,
Aggregate supply is characterized by a Phillips-curve, which describes the change of inflation as dependent upon the lagged output gap. Lagged income and real interest rates determine aggregate demand. The central bank minimizes its loss function by optimally adjusting its monetary policy instrument, the short-term nominal interest rate.
Now the argument linking inflation and de facto JI starts from a related but slightly different angle, namely the relationship between real growth and potential output. As demonstrated by Feld and Voigt (2003) , higher de facto JI facilitates real growth. Since this is not a business cycle phenomenon but a long-term trend, it will affect potential output positively. The output gap in the aggregate supply curve becomes negative. In the next period, this effect will start generating downward pressure on the inflation rate. Since the inflation rate is persistent, there will be a gradual dynamic adjustment towards a lower inflation rate. At the same time, the central bank will begin to reduce interest rates to exploit the gain in terms of lower inflation for more output. The resulting increase in actual output will start narrowing the output gap until it is zero in equilibrium. While the equilibrium inflation rate will be the same before and after the positive shock in potential output, the average inflation rate computed over the relevant adjustment period will be lower in the situation after the shock. Note that this channel works for different combinations of central bank preferences and economic structures. Both economic structure and preferences will influence the dynamic path of prices and thereby the average inflation rate over the transitional period. For instance, a high value for λ leads to a gradual adjustment of inflation to its long-run target, as the central bank tries to avoid large negative output fluctuations. Since we do not know the structural and preference parameters in practice, it is difficult to make precise quantitative predictions. However, at least qualitatively, higher de facto JI will lead to lower average inflation rates independently of any time-inconsistency considerations.
To summarize, we have developed two theoretical hypotheses that link inflation and legal system both in a situation of a long-run equilibrium as well as a business cycle adjustment situation. We call this a direct effect of the legal system on inflation, as it does not involve the intermediary stage of CBI, which lies at the heart of the previous hypotheses discussed in the literature. Hence, we would expect that a higher degree of judicial independence or confidence in the legal system should lead to lower inflation over and above their effect on the credibility of monetary policy through CBI.
Estimation Approach and Data Description
So far, two main hypotheses have been developed: firstly that de facto JI should be a good predictor for de facto CBI and secondly that indicators signaling a high degree of factual JI or a high degree of confidence of the population in the legal system should affect the inflation rate directly. In order to test the first hypothesis, some proxy for factual CBI is needed. Most previous studies have relied on the turnover rate of central bank governors (defined as "the actual average term of office of CB governors") which has been suggested by Cukierman (1992, 383) or a modified concept, namely the political vulnerability of central bank governors which indicates the probability that central bank governors will be removed from their offices during the six months following a change in government (introduced by Cukierman and Webb 1995) .
De facto CBI has thus been operationalized by the turnover rate (TOR) of central bank governors. The higher the turnover rate, the more dependent is the central bank governor perceived to be. This is, of course, a very crude proxy for the factual independence of a central bank. The government might have other means to influence monetary policy than simply getting rid off the central bank governor. In fact, the expulsion of a central bank governor can even be interpreted as the governor having resisted government influence because otherwise the government might not have resorted to such a drastic means as firing the governor. Indeed, it could even be argued that central bank governors who always act according to the wishes of government have a very low probability of ever being fired. Interpreted like this, low turnover rates could even stand for low independence! However, due to the lack of better proxies, we rely on the TOR here too as a proxy for de facto CBI (Cukierman and Webb 1995) .
The employed indicator for de facto JI is analyzed in more detail in Hayo and Voigt (2003) . For simplicity, this indicator measures the independence of the highest court of a country, no matter whether it is a supreme court or a constitutional court. In many states, the judiciary is made up of thousands of decision-makers and, therefore, radical simplification is necessary. The focus on the highest court seems warranted because even though judges are personally independent, the ultimate control of court decisions lies with the highest courts, as they review -on the initiative of the parties involved -the lower court decisions. The independence of the highest court thus seems crucial. We propose to test the indirect channel between inflation and de facto JI by estimating the following regression:
(1) TOR = β 0 + β 1 de facto JI + β 2 CEO + ε CEO is a control variable that captures the formal term of office. A higher turnover rate due to a shorter formal length of office should not be interpreted as a sign of low credibility which is why we control for it. Our theory predicts a negative sign for de facto JI.
As argued above, de facto CBI might be determined by the degree of checks and balances as well as by the degree of de facto JI. Keefer and Stasavage (2003) Since we specifically focus upon the role of the legal system, it seems interesting to combine the empirical approaches based on veto powers within the executive and the legislative and to test for an additional and direct influence of the judicial system on the inflation rate. policy. If, on the one hand, we only found the indirect channel to be significant, it would be clear that an identified direct effect in models 3 and 4 is spurious. If, on the other hand, both effects turned out to be significant then this is evidence that both channels might be simultaneously present.
In the theoretical section, it was argued that the general confidence of the population in the legal system might be an alternative to de facto JI. These two variables are positively correlated with a coefficient of 0.18. We thus re-estimate equations 1-5 substituting de facto JI for legal trust.
This variable is based on three waves of the World Values Survey (1981, 1990, and 1995-97) .
About 1000 randomly selected people in about 50 different countries and regions were asked a
multitude of questions concerning values and attitudes (see World Values Study Group 2000).
The actual question used here is worded as follows: "Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed (here: The legal system), how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all?"
Estimation Results
In the empirical analysis, the sample size varies depending on the included variables. At a minimum we have 34 countries, more than one third of which are not members of the OECD.
The maximum sample size is 51, with some half of the countries being OECD members. We Notes: The symbols (*), *, ** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level.
Models 1a and 2a contain dummy variables for Brazil and Uganda to reduce the extent of nonnormality. Tests for heteroscedasticity are based on White (1980) using squares of regressors and squares of regressors plus cross-products, respectively. The normality test is due to Jarque and Bera (1987) with a small-sample correction, and the RESET test for misspecification is based on Ramsey (1969) . The instability test is a within-sample test suggested by Hansen (1992) .
In Model 2a, we add the veto power indicator put forward by Keefer and Stasavage (2003) . Now the marginal significance level for de facto JI is 0.12. It should be noted that while none of the other variables is significant, this is partially due to the collinearity between CEO and
LnChecks. If one were to remove LnChecks, the remaining variables would be significant at a 5% level of significance, except for de facto, which gets a p-value of 0.11. While the indicator is only marginally significant when using de facto JI, it becomes significantly negative at a 5% level when including the legal trust variable as shown by the estimates of Model 2b. The RESET test indicates some misspecification, however. To allow for a relationship between checks and de facto JI, we also augment the above regression by interacting these two variables. It turns out, however, that the interaction is not significant (results omitted). Hence, we find that de facto JI has an additional influence on the turnover rate over and above the effect of institutional veto power and we interpret this as evidence for the indirect channel outlined above. The coefficient of determination of these regressions is not particularly high, and thus does not explain the turnover rate very well. This may be due to the fact that the turnover rate is a very noisy indicator of de facto CBI. Table 2 summarizes the result related to the analysis of the direct influence of the legal system on the inflation rate. 3 Model 3a regresses the de facto JI, degree of openness, and de jure CBI on the logarithm of the inflation rate. First, the diagnostic tests of Model 3a are fine except for some indication of misspecification. We find that openness has a significantly negative effect on inflation as shown earlier by Romer (1993).
3 We also estimated the effect of interacting legal trust and CBI. This variable is highly collinear to legal trust and slightly less significant. Notes: See notes to Table 1 .
De jure CBI, on the other hand, is not significantly different from zero. This is the well-known result that the relationship between formal CBI and inflation breaks down in a sample that includes countries that are not members of the OECD. 4 However, our indicator of de facto JI is significant at the 1% level. A similar outcome is found when using legal trust instead of de facto JI as shown in Model 3b.
In Model 4a, we add a variable measuring the political constraints of a government (Polcon) and its interaction with de jure CBI. In Keefer and Stasavage (2003) , this variable performed better with respect to explaining inflation than the LnChecks variable used in the turnover rate regression. It can be shown that this is also true for our sample (results omitted). Now we find that de jure CBI is significantly positive at a 5% level, thus contradicting the basic hypothesis of higher CBI leading to lower inflation. However, the interaction between political constraints and Model 5 shows that significance of all variables in model 4c remains except for openness. Thus, there is evidence for a separate direct channel of the legal system on inflation. At the same time, legal trust is now only significant at the 5% level. Thus, some explanatory power of legal trust is taken up by the turnover rate, which reflects the impact of the indirect channel. Note that the interaction between POLCON and de jure CBI is even more significant. This suggests that there must be an additional direct channel present that links this interaction variable with the inflation rate that is not explored in Keefer and Stasavage (2003) . We conclude, therefore, that there is evidence for both a direct influence as well as an indirect influence from the legal system to the inflation rate.
Conclusion
This paper analyses the relationship between de facto central bank independence, inflation, and the legal system. We argue that a more independent legal system is an important determinant of both de facto CBI and inflation. The independence of the legal system is measured via two indicators, de facto judicial independence and legal trust. The former is an indicator based on Feld and Voigt (2003) , the latter is computed from the World Values Survey. The influence of the legal system on the inflation rate works via two channels, an indirect and a direct one. The indirect channel is based on the strengthening of de facto CBI in the case of an independent and trustworthy legal system. The direct channel suggests that higher judicial independence lowers transaction costs within the economy and thereby increases efficiency. Consequently, we would expect a fall in the natural rate of unemployment and an increase in potential output. Within simple but widely used models of monetary policy, we show that this will lead to a reduction of the equilibrium rate of inflation (Barro and Gordon 1983) and a fall of the average rate of inflation over the relevant time period (Svensson 1997).
Putting our hypothesis to the test, we find that there is both evidence of an indirect channel of the legal system affecting inflation via de facto CBI as well as for a direct channel. Evidence for the working of the indirect channel is demonstrated within a regression explaining de facto CBI as proxied by the central bank governor turnover rate. A higher degree of de facto JI or legal trust will decrease the turnover rate, controlling for the influence of the formal length of office and the checks and balances working within the executive and legislative branches of government. The direct relationship between the legal system and inflation is investigated in a regression explaining the logarithm of the inflation rate. Controlling for the influence of openness, de jure CBI, political constraints, and political constraints interacted with de jure CBI, we show that legal trust in particular adds a substantial degree of explanatory power. In our sample, such a model can explain 60% of the variation in the logarithm of the inflation rate. We also establish that the direct influence of the legal system on the inflation rate is present even if we control for the working of the indirect channel. Thus, both channels appear to affect the change in prices as separate channels, although we find more robust evidence for the direct effect. Hence, in addition to traditional factors, such as central bank independence or openness, or alternative factors (surveyed in Hayo and Hefeker 2002), such as interest group influences or public inflation aversion, the legal system appears to be yet another noteworthy determinant of the average inflation rate.
De facto JI
The indicator for de facto JI is based on the following list of eight variables (see Feld and Voigt 2003) . All variables can take on values between 0 and 1. The unweighted sum of the variables is then divided by the number of variables for which information is available.
(1-3) A crucial aspect of de facto JI will be the effective average term length of the members of the highest court.5 If the actual term length and the one to be expected on the basis of the legal foundations deviate, this is interpreted as a signal for a low level of factual independence.
Removing a judge before the end of term is a serious breach of JI and countries where this has occurred get a low score.
(4) The influence of a judge depends on the number of other judges who are members of the same court. By increasing the number of judges, the weight of the sitting judges can be reduced.
The de facto indicator counts how many times the number of judges has been changed since 1960.
(5-6) In order to be factually independent, judges need to be paid adequately. It was therefore inquired whether the incomes of judges have at least remained constant in real terms since 1960.
But the efficacy of courts does not only depend on the income level of their judges but also on the number of clerks employed, the size of the library, the availability of modern computer equipment etc. This aspect has been taken into account by asking for the development of the court's budget as an organization (also since 1960).
5. This variable is closely reminiscent of the turnover rate calculated for central bank governors and used as a proxy for their de facto independence. Henisz (2000) has calculated this variable for the tenure of supreme court judges for 45 countries for the period from 1960 to 1990.
(7) Any change in the basis of the legal foundation of the highest court will increase uncertainty among its potential users, i.e. will be counter to one of the most fundamental functions of the law. Frequent changes of the respective legal rules are therefore interpreted as an indicator for low de facto independence.
(8)
The de facto degree of judicial independence is low if decisions of the highest court, in order to be implemented, depend on some action of one (or both) of the other branches of government and this cooperation is not granted. The more frequently this has been the case, the less independent is JI supposed to be factually.
